(written in 2018) - 1A: Logical priority of conventional methods of determining thoughts over brain scanner - Is this related to the fact that the brain scanner is purely correlation, rather than based on some fundamental theory? - If we had a more fundamental theory that the brain scanner’s workings fit in with (e.g. quantum mechanics), then we would be more likely to embrace the absurd scenario of the subject being insane (and/or we failed to identify his environment) rather than saying quantum mechanics is wrong. - Surely there are historical examples where X is a ground for some technique Y, but for various reasons eventually Y becomes ground for X? - Logically-prior = closer to the ‘center’ of the web-of-beliefs. - Furthermore, this example only works if it is possible that there is a conflict (in the world where there is perfect correlation, then we can identify brain activity with thoughts) - 1B: “To be a brain state is one kind of thing, to have a thought is a different kind of thing” - This is a good point towards saying they are not ‘literally’ identical, in the sense of “My dad’s wife” and “My mom” being literally ‘different’ (they have different truth conditions) but may be equivalent given some state of affairs. - This is perhaps sufficient to say “no reason to think brains in vats can think” … but at least it’s sufficient for “there is a reason to think brains in vats cannot think”. - What this argument does not show (which maybe Ed is advocating) is that it is incoherent to identify brain states with mental states. If we can identify them, then they both are both kinds of things and there are no - There may be an isomorphism between the “logical space of reasons” and the space of brain states related by physical causality. - If brain states (and their relations) were in bijective corrspondance to thoughts, then we can refer to a brain state by its thought and vice versa. Whether or not this is the case is precisely the debate at hand, but bringing this point up does not advance the argument one way or another. - How to decide whether to believe such an isomorphism likely exists is complicated. - 2: - The belief that there is a table in front of me (even in brain-in-vat scenario) IS answerable to reality (and the the belief is false). Likewise for intentions (the intention will be unfulfilled, unless one is desiring to be a brain in a vat) - How does this bear on the legality of killing comatose people (they are in an analogous situation)